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1 Introduction:
The adoption of standards is acknowledged by the WTO that recognizes a coun-
try´s right to adopt the standards it considers appropriate. Article 20 of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) allows governments to act on
trade in order to protect human, animal or plant life or health, provided they do
not discriminate or use this as disguised protectionism. Not surprisingly quality
standards have become an integral part of industrial, and international trade,
policy around the world. The role of quality standards in trade is highlighted
by the debate on increasing globalization. An importing country can simply not
allow the imports of a good if it considers that it does not meet the minimum
standards set by a country
1
. In this sense standards can act as entry barriers in
some markets. A perverse incentive may thus exist among countries to contin-
ually “upgrade” standards under the pretext of environmental, health, or other
such standards
2
.
Authors both in International Trade and Industrial Organization have stud-
ied Minimum Quality Standards. In International Trade MQS have been studied
by Chiang and Mason (1988), Das and Donnenfeld (1989), and Boom (1995).
Chiang and Masson (1988) show that an MQS above the equilibrium quality
increases quality and equates domestic salaries to world levels. Domestic wel-
fare increases in this case.Das and Donnenfeld (1989) show that a MQS can
decrease domestic welfare of the country imposing it. Similarly, Boom (1995)
shows that an importing country has no incentive to impose a MQS slightly
above the lowest quality produced in an unregulated market.
In Industrial Organization MQS have been studied by Ronnen (1991), Cram-
pes and Hollander (1995), Ecchia and Lambertini (1997) and Valleti (2000).
Ronnen (1991) shows that if the government sets a MQS in some determined
range then an equilibrium exists in which both firms stay in the market and
domestic welfare increases. This result, however, is shown not to be robust.
First, Ronnen (1991) does not analyze the equilibrium of the entire game in
the sense that he does not solve for the optimum MQS.The analysis is instead
performed for an MQS slightly above the lowest quality in the market. Second,
Valleti (2000) shows that if firms compete in quantity then total welfare can
decrease. Finally, Ecchia and Lambertini (1997) (extending Crampes and Hol-
lander (1995)) endogenously determine the optimal MQS in a model without
sunk costs (of quality). The optimal MQS increases total welfare in their model.
In this paper we first first look at an optimal MQS on imports
3
. Extending
Ronnen (1991) we first show that domestic welfare goes up if the government
1
This is specially true for trade between developed and underdeveloped countries.
2
The use of differing standards may be justified by present political priorities. One good
example along these lines are emission standards as set in the U.S and EU. In the US standards
lean more towards blocking smog forming nitrogen oxides and cancer causing particulates
(emissions of these kinds mainly arise from diesel engines). While in Europe the emphasis
(till now) has been on global warming. As a result diesel technology has flourished in the EU
while it is practically noon-existent in the U.S.
3
Note, except Ecchia and Lambertini (2000) none of the papers above have studied the
optimal MQS.
1
were to only choose an optimal MQS, however, the market is then served only
by a monopoly
4
. This occurs as the optimal MQS is very high and pushes out
the low quality firm from the market. The optimal MQS increases domestic
welfare
5
relative to free trade under Cournot competition.
6
We then look at
an ex-post import tariff on imports
7
. Firms, anticipating the tariff, decrease
investment in quality. This lowers both consumer surplus and welfare. Finally,
we propose an ex-post tariff that is contingent upon the minimum quality (MQL)
set by the government. Unlike a MQS the MQL allows imports if the quality
of the good does not meet the MQL. A firm that meets the MQL is exempt
from the import tariff. Contrarily, a firm that does not meet the MQL pays an
import tariff. In this sense the import tariff is contingent upon the quality and
is time consistent. The advantage
8
of the tariff contingent MQL is that quality
improvement is achieved and both the firms still serve the market. Further, the
MQL improves welfare over free trade for the importing country.
The government selects its trade policy instrument in two stages. In the
first stage, the government announces the MQL that would exempt a firm from
paying the tariff. Firms, knowing the MQL, then invest in quality. After firms
select quality, the government then chooses its tariff level. The tariff level is de-
fined by the MQL tariff rule that the government announces in the first stage.
9
In this sense the import tariff is conditional on the quality chosen by the firms.
MQLs may be interpreted as being less restrictive than Minimum Quality Stan-
dards (MQS) as they allow imports below the minimum quality limits. Under
a MQL imports are allowed even if the quality of the imported good lies below
it. However, a firm failing to meet the MQL pays a tariff.
Facing such an import tariff exporting firms have two options: invest in
a quality level that is equal or greater than, or is inferior to, the minimum
(knowing that it will then face a subsequent tariff). In such a scenario we analyse
the effect of import tariffs chosen by an importing country when the imported
good is of a high and a low quality. We show that if the government only sets
an ex-post import tariff (set after the firms invest in quality) then the tariff
lowers both consumer surplus and welfare. However, if the government were
to set a conditional import tariff then domestic welfare goes up. Conditional
import tariffs increase consumer surplus, market coverage and total welfare of
the importing country.
4
Unlike Boom (1995) the importing country does have an incentive to set an MQS. However,
it is high enough such that a monopoly is obtained.
5
Contrary to Valleti (2000) in our model under Cournot competition total welfare goes up
under a MQS.
6
This theoretical result is not realistic. For example, zero emissions maybe optimal, how-
ever, this will push all the firms out of the market.
7
In a third market model Brander and Spencer (1985) show that an importing country has
incentives to set an import tariff in response to an export subsidy of the exporting country.
8
Given that the optimal MQS results in a monopoly serving the market (clearly an unre-
alistic situation) and that the optimal tariff decreases quality thereby lowering welfare.
9
The issue of intervention as a strategic choice has been analysed by several authors.
Cooper & Riezman (1989), Arvan (1991), Shivakumar (1993) and Hwang & Shulman (1994)
model government policy in two stages . In these papers the government first announces the
trade policy instrument and later decides on its level.
2
Setting a MQL the government is able to influence quality investment in a
positive manner benefitting domestic consumers. Due to greater commitment
power of the government (relative to that of the firm) it is able to positively
influence quality investment by the firms. This is the strategic advantage that
the government loses if were to choose tariffs that were not conditional on the
MQL. The firm is able to counteract the effectiveness of a single intrument, i.e.
tariff, by strategically decreasing its quality investment. However, under the
conditional tariff the government is able to counteract this negative effect on
quality through the MQL.
We further show that outcomes depend upon whether the government is
able to set a discriminative, or uniform, conditional tariffs for the, high and
low quality, imported goods. If the government were to discriminate and set
a different conditional import tariff for the high and low quality firm it would
obtain a higher level of welfare. In this case the MQL would be set high enough
such that the low quality firm would pay the import tariff thus increasing gov-
ernment revenues. The high quality firm on the other hand produces a quality
just equal to the MQL and evades paying the tariff. If the government were to
only charge a uniform conditional tariff then it only influences quality invest-
ment by the low quality firm. The high quality firm prefers the situation where
both the firms pay the import tariff. The uniform tariff is high enough for the
low quality firm and relatively low for the high quality firm. The high MQL
seriously undermines the competitiveness of the low quality firm. As a result,
paying the tariff the high quality firm increases its profits taking advantage of
the negative effect the tariff has on its rival.Total welfare achieved under a con-
ditional discrminative, and uniform, tariff is greater than under free trade. Note
that, our results show that including variables such as quality (that positively
impact consumer surplus) can have an important effect on results.
10
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the model under
free trade. Section 3 studies import tariffs. Section 4 studies conditional import
tariffs. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
We study a vertically differentiated industry where a high and low quality firm
export to a third market. There is no domestic consumption in the exporting
countries. The third country is a pure consumer of the imported goods and has
no domestic production. Consumers are uniformly distributed in the importing
country and are identified by their taste parametere θ, which is distributed
uniformly over the interval
[
0, θ
]
, with θ > 0. Each consumer has unitary
demand for the good. A consumer with parameter θ obtains utility U = θs− p,
if he purchases one unit of the good at price p and quality s. Utility is zero if
a consumer does not purchase the good. Note that θ can also be interpreted
10
In our model quality investment is a long run variable that allows firms to commit before
governments fix their tariff levels. See Grossman (1988), Sutton (1991) and Herguera, Kujal
and Petrakis (2000,2002) for a discussion on long and short run competition variables.
3
as the marginal rate of substitution between income and quality ratio (Tirole,
1989, p. 96).
The high and low quality firm compete in quantities. In the first stage firms
invest in quality which is then taken as given in the quantity competition stage.
In this sense quality is a long run decision variable. Firms first choose quality
and then compete in quantities. The marginal cost of produciton, c, is constant
and is independent of costs of quality. The marginal cost of production is set
equal to zero without loss of generality. Quality costs are fixed and costs of qual-
ity improvement are increasing. This specification captures the characteristics
of a (pure) vertical product differentiation model. Shaked and Sutton (1983)
define a purely vertically differentiated industry as one in which the costs of
quality improvement fall primarily into fixed costs and involve only a modest,
or no, increase in unit variable costs. Quality costs borne in the first stage are
treated as sunk in the market competition stage. For reasons of tractability
we assume that quality costs are quadratic, s
2
/2,. We solve the game using
subgame perfection.
2.1 Quantity competition:
We first determine the demand function faced by the firms. Let θ
12
be the
taste parameter of the consumer that is indifferent between purchasing the high,
or low, quality good. Setting, θ
12
s
1
− p
1
= θ
12
s
2
− p
2
, we can then write
θ
12
=
p
1
−p
2
s
1
−s
2
. Similarly, we define θ
02
as the taste parameter of the consumer
that is indifferent between purchasing the low quality good and not purchasing
at all. Setting, θ
02
s
2
− p
2
= 0, we then get θ
02
=
p
2
s
2
. Given θ
12
and θ
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we can
now determine the demand that each firm faces.
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is the demand faced by the low quality firm. These then give us the indirect
demands:
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Firms maximize profits. The equilibrium quantities in this stage are given
by:
q
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=
(2s
1
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2
) θ
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(2a)
q
2
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1
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2
(2b)
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Given quantities [2a] y [2b] firms choose qualitites in the first stage. Maxi-
mizing profits with respect to qualities gives us the first order conditions:
∂Π
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∂s
1
= 0; s
1
= θ
2
16s
3
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− 12s
2
1
s
2
+ 4s
1
s
2
2
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3
2
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3
(3a)
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= θ
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2
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(4s
1
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2
)
(4s
1
− s
2
)
3
(3b)
Figure 1: Quality reaction functions under free trade..
The quality reaction functions [3a] y [3b] are described in the figure 1. The
intersection of the reaction function correspond to the Nash equilibrium in qual-
ity choices:
s
∗
1
= 0.2519θ
2
s
∗
2
= 0.0902θ
2
Given qualities one can then write the prices, quantities and profits
11
:
s
FT
1
= 0.251942θ
2
s
FT
2
= 0.090223θ
2
q
FT
1
= 0.450834θ q
FT
2
= 0.274583θ
p
FT
1
= 0.1133584θ
3
p
FT
2
= 0.024774θ
3
Π
FT
1
= 0.01947θ
4
Π
FT
2
= 0.002732θ
4
Table 1: Valores de equilibrio bajo libre comercio.
11
These are the values that one obtains in the free trade model (see Motta, (1993)).
5
Consumer surplus if defined by the following expression:
CS =
∫
θ
12
θ
02
(θs
2
− p
2
)dθ +
∫
θ
θ
12
(θs
1
− p
1
)dθ
Total welfare in this case is defined by the sum of the consumer surplus of the
high and low quality consumers, and is given by:
CS
FT
= 0.040174θ
4
SW
FT
= 0.040174θ
4
3 Import tariffs
In a third market Brander and Spencer (1985) model study the trade policy
of an importing country when the two exporting countries subsidize exports.
They show that for certain demands the import tariff is positive and is wel-
fare improving. We focus only on the import policy of a consuming country
with no domestic production. We show that an import tariff imposed by a
non-producing import country is welfare decreasing. This occurs as firms an-
ticipating the import tariff optimally respond by lowering quality investment.
Decreased quality investment by both the firms lowers average quality resulting
in a decline in consumer surplus (and hence total welfare). This result empha-
sizes the importance of studying the effect of trade policy instruments on long
run variables such as quality and the important effect they can have on wel-
fare
12
. The direct positive effect of tariff revenues in this can be counteracted
by the effect the tariff has on qualitites.
In this section we introduce the possibility that an importing country im-
poses tariffs on its imports. The imported goods are of high, and low, quality.
Our simple framework allows us to study the effect of an import tariff on qual-
ity
13
. We show that an importing country lowers domestic welfare if it imposes
import tariffs. Import tariffs are welfare decreasing in our framework due to the
effect of tariffs on quality investment. Exporting firms, anticipating the import
tariff, invest less in quality. The quality of imported goods as a result declines.
This decline in quality lowers consumer surplus. The decline in consumer sur-
plus is greater than tariff revenues and as results in a welfare decline for the
importing country. This impact of quality on total welfare is not captured in
the horizotal product differentiation models. In our model we show that even
though tariff revenues are positive an import tariff can be welfare decreasing
due to the fall in the quality of imports. The affect of trade policy instruments
on long run variables can give dramatically different results.
12
Herguera, Kujal and Petrakis, forthcoming, show that an importing country with a single
domestic firm may be more agressive in its trade policies (tariffs) if the domestic firm is low
quality. Profit shifting from an agressive policy is greater in this case prompting a high import
tariff.
13
In the following section we extend the analysis by including Minimum Quality Limits.
6
We consider an import tariff. Facing such a tariff firm profits are:
Π
i
= p
i
q
i
− t
i
q
i
−
s
2
i
2
, i = 1, 2
The sequence of moves that we consider is the following. In the first stage
firms invest in quality. Given the quality investment the government chooses
welfare maximizing import tariffs. Given tariffs and qualities firms compete in
quantities in the last stage (see figure 2)
14
.
Figure 2: The import tariff game.
As can be seen, in this scenario an import tariff not only impacts short
run variables such as quantity, it also affects firm investment in quality. Firms
anticipate the ex-post optimal tariff and optimally respond by changing quality
investment. The resulting decrease in consumer surplus is greater than the tariff
revenues and hence total welfare declines.
In this section we study import tariffs, uniform or discriminative, on both
the imported goods. Firm maximize profits and choose quantities. The first
order conditions give us the following quantities:
q
1
=
2s
1
− s
2
− 2t
1
+ t
2
4s
1
− s
2
(4a)
q
2
=
s
1
s
2
+ t
1
s
2
− 2t
2
s
1
s
2
(4s
1
− s
2
)
(4b)
It can be seen from the reaction functions that quantities are decreasing (in-
creasing) in own (other) tariffs. Tariff revenues obtained by the government are
the following:
R = t
1
q
1
+ t
2
q
2
(5)
Total domestic welfare is defined as the sum of the consumer surplus and tariff
revenues:
SW = CS +R (6)
We study the possibility that the importing government sets tariffs on both
the high and the low quality good. In this case the government has two choices,
it can either set a uniform, or discriminatory, tariff on both the goods
15
. We
14
This sequence of moves allows us to later study import tariffs conditional on Minimum
Quality Limits.
15
The analysis for tariff only on the low, or high, quality firm can be seen in the appendix.
7
show that a non-discriminative tariff is welfare improving compared to the dis-
criminative tariff. Welfare under the non-discriminative tariff is lower than
under free trade. The single uniform tariff, being higher than the discrimina-
tory low-quality tariff, has a greater effect on the low quality firm (than the
high quality firm). As a result profits for the low quality firm deciline more and
it invests less in quality. Meanwhile, the high quality firm also invests less in
quality. Due to the fall in both the qualities, consumer surplus declines and this
decline is of a higher magnitude than the import tariff revenues This results in
a decline in overall welfare under the non-discriminatory tariff.
The story under a discriminatory tariff is slightly different. The low quality
firm now invests more in quality than under the uniform tariff earning greater
profits. The high quality firm, however, faces a very high tariff and invests
much less in quality earning less than under the uniform tariff. The decline in
quality is greater resulting in a greater decline in consumer surplus (relative to
the uniform tariff). This decline in consumer surplus is greater than observed
under the uniform tariff and dominates the increase in tariff revenues. Total
welfare as a result declines relative to the uniform tariff and free trade. One of
the interesting results emerging out of this section is that tariff policies increasing
in qualities are welfare decreasing
16
.
3.0.1 Uniform tariff
The government sets a uniform tariff, t, on all of its imports maximizing total
welfare:
max
t
SW
where SW is the total welfare [6] and the tariff paid by each firm is t
1
= t
2
= t.
From the first order condition we obtain the welfare maximizing import tariff.
t =
2s
1
s
2
(2s
1
− s
2
) θ
12s
2
1
− 5s
1
s
2
+ s
2
2
(7)
In the first stage firms simultaneously choose qualities. The first order con-
ditions from their maximization problem gives us:
s
1
=
432s
6
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− 540s
5
1
s
2
+ 336s
4
1
s
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− 185s
3
1
s
3
2
+ 75s
2
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s
2
+ s
2
2
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3
(8b)
One can see in the figure (3) that the import tariff shifts the reaction func-
tions towards the origin. Both firms reduce quality investment. The shift in
the low quality reaction function is greater than the shift in the high quality
reaction fucntion. The low quality firm as a result invests much less in quality.
16
This contrasts with the fact that most government policies tax the high quality good more
than a lower quality good.
8
The shift of the high quality reaction function is much smaller. The qualty de-
cline for the high quality firm is much less. Profits for the high quality firm are
greater than under free trade as the uniform tariff impacts the low quality firm
negatively making it less competitive. This increases the competitive advanatge
of the high quality firm increasing its profits.
Figure 3: Uniform tariff: Quality reaction functions.
Equilibrium quantity, prices, qualities and profits are:
s
B
1
= 0.250001θ
2
s
B
2
= 0.008327θ
2
q
B
1
= 0.493011θ q
B
2
= 0.087312θ
p
B
1
= 0.126021θ
3
p
B
2
= 0.003494θ
3
Π
B
1
= 0.029515θ
4
Π
B
2
= 0.000029θ
4
Table 2: Equilibrium values under a uniform import tariff.
The welfare maximizing uniform tariff set by the government is t
B
= 0.002767θ
3
and
total revenues obtained by the government are R
B
= 0.001606θ
4
. Consumer
surplus for the high, and low, quality consumers is CS
B
1
= 0.030741θ
4
and
CS
B
2
= 0.000032θ
4
, respectively. Total welfare under the uniform tariff is
SW
B
= 0.032379θ
4
.
Both the firms decrease quality investment. The uniform tariff is worse
for the low quality firm. It decreases quality investment by a greater amount
relative to the high quality firm. Output sold by the low quality firm falls due
to the decline in its quality. Given the decrease in quality investment by the
low quality firm, the high quality firm responds optimally and also decreases its
quality investment. Due to increased product differentiation the high quality
firm makes greater profits, selling more output than it did under free trade.
9
Total output sold declines under the uniform tariff. Compared with free trade
total welfare declines under the uniform tariff.
Proposition 1 Total welfare under a uniform import tariff, SW
B
= 0.032379θ
4
,
is smaller than under free trade, SW
FT
= 0.040174θ
4
. Total output and con-
sumer surplus decline under the uniform tariff.
3.0.2 Discriminatory tariffs
In this section we allow the importing government to set a discriminatory tariff
on the low, and high, quality firm. The domestic government then maximizes
total welfare over the high, and, low quality tariff, t
1
, t
2
. The goverment maxi-
mizes total welfare:
max
t
1
,t
2
SW
The solution to the first order conditions gives us the following tariffs.
t
1
=
s
1
(3s
1
− s
2
) θ
9s
1
− s
2
(9a)
t
2
=
2s
1
s
2
θ
9s
1
− s
2
(9b)
It is easy to see that the tariff on the high quality import is always greater
than the tariff on the low quality import. Further, the high quality discrimina-
tory tariff (see [9a]) is always greater than the uniform tariff (see [9a]). Com-
pared to the uniform tariff the low quality firm faces a lower tariff under the
discriminatory tariff.
In the first stage firms maximize profits and obtain the following quality
reaction function.
s
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(s
2
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81s
3
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− 27s
2
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2
+ 3s
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2
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3
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(9s
1
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2
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(10a)
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2
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(9s
1
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2
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(9s
1
− s
2
)
3
(10b)
The implicit reaction functions [10a] and [10b], can be seen in the figure 4.
Under the tariff both the reaction functions shift inwards. The import tariff
on the high quality firm being greater its reaction function shifts by a greater
amount than under the uniform tariff. Given that the import tariff faced by the
low quality firm is smaller its reaction function shifts in by a smaller amount. A
discriminatory tariffs favors the low quality and works against the high quality
firm. The equilibrium values for quality, output, prices and profits are:
Quality investment, output and profits decline for both the firms relative
to free trade. Compared with a uniform tariff quality, quantity and profits
for the high quality firm decline. The low quality firm, however, invests more
in quality, sells more and increases its profits. The discriminatory low and
10
Figure 4: Discriminatory tariffs.
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= 0.003019θ
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Π
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4
Table 3: Equilibrium values under a discriminatory import tariff.
high quality tariffs are t
1
= 0.031861θ
3
and t
2
= 0.015239θ
3
, and total tariff
revenue accruing to the government is R = 0.012779θ
4
. Consumer surplus for
the high, and low, quality consumers is CS
1
= 0.008961θ
4
and CS
2
= 0.00181θ
4
,
respectively. Total welfare under the discriminatory tariff is SW = 0.02355θ
4
.
Proposition 2 Compared to free trade, SW
FT
= 0.040174θ
4
, total welfare
under a discriminatory tariff declines, SW
˜
B
= 0.02355θ
4
. Further, total welfare
also declines compared to the uniform tariff, SW
B
= 0.032379θ
4
.
Firms anticipating a discriminatory tariff invest less in quality. Even though
tariff revenues increase total welfare declines due to the sharp fall in consumer
surplus. A uniform tariff favors the high quality firm while the discriminatry
tariff works against the high quality firm. The ability of the government to
discriminate in this case works to its detriment and total welfare declines. Of
course one needs to keep in mind that with a single instrument the government
is targeting both output and quality. Anticipating the tariff the firm is thus able
to strategically respond by lowering its quality thus diminishing the effectiveness
of the tariff. The negative effect on quality investment in this case negates the
increase in tariff revenues.
11
4 Conditional tariffs
In the last section we studied the effect of ex-post import tariffs on an importing
countries welfare. We saw that any import tariff lowers domestic welfare due
to the effect of the tariff on quality invesment. Anticipating the ex-post tariff
firms lower quality investment thus resulting in a decline in consumer surplus.
This decline is greater than the additional tariff revenues. This result points out
the importance of long run variables (such as quality) in determining welfare
outcomes. The effect of these variables on welfare can be of a greater magnitude
and can lower welfare impacting consumer surplus. If long run variables are
negatively affected then ex-post import tariffs can be welfare decreasing (unlike
the welfare incresing effect observed in Brander and Spencer (1985)).
One should, however, note that in Brander and Spencer there is one target,
i.e. output, and one instrument, i.e. a tariff. In our model this is not the
case. Governments can impact both quality and output through the import
tariff. Hence a simple comparision of our earlier result to Brander and Spencer
(1985) may not be fully justified. A more appropriate government policy may
be one that uses two instruments on (its) two target variables, i.e. quality and
output. It may be argued that such policy instruments are more appropriate for
industries characterised by the presence of both long, and short, run variables.
Keeping this in mind we propose a non-linear policy instrument that can be
used by governments in such industries. We propose the use of conditional im-
port tariffs. A conditional import tariff depends on a certain Minimum Quality
Limit set by the importing government. If a firm invests above the MQL it is
exempt from paying the import tariff, otherwise it pays an import tariff. In
our structure Minimum Quality Limits (MQLs) and import tariffs are a pair of
possible policy instruments
17
at the governments disposal. Minimum Quality
Limits (MQLs) are defined as quality limits set by the government that if un-
fulfilled result in the good being taxed. In this sense MQLs are less restrictive
than Minimum Quality Standards as they permit the sale of the good if the
quality is below the limit set by the standard. Our version of MQLs is more
flexible than the MQS, goods are taxed if they do not meet the MQL. Further,
most industries have quality standards as an integral part of a governments in-
dustrial policy. Our use of MQL’s is motivated by the fact that a government
valuing consumer welfare finds in its own interest to promote quality investment
by firms due to their welfare improving effects.
We analyze two types of conditional tariffs. In the first case the government
sets a uniform quality conditional tariff (applied to both the firms) on its im-
ports. In the second case we allow the government to discriminate between the
firms when setting the conditional tariff. The government in this case can set
a different conditional tariff for the high, and low, quality firm. The sequence
of moves that we study is the following (see figure ??). The government first
sets the MQL. Given the MQL firms then invest in quality. A firm may choose,
or not, to meet the MQL. If the firms meet, or exceed, the MQL they pay no
17
We only consider these two policy instruments in this paper.
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tariffs on their exports. The quality chosen by the firms is of course decided by
the tradeoff between the profits gained by the marginal quality increment and
the increase in quality costs such that the firm does not pay the import tariff
18
.
Figure 5: The Conditional Tariff Game.
The government is interested in such a policy as the cost of quality improve-
ment falls only on the exporting countries. An increase in quality in this case
implies an increase in the importing countries welfare through the increase in
consumer surplus. Looking at it this way the conditional tariff can be inter-
preted as a mechanism to increase firm investment in quality above the levels
observed under free trade. Of course, by choosing its quality investment the
firm decides whether it is in its benefit to choose a quality that exempts it from
paying the tariff, or not.
In the following section we study such conditional tariffs. First we study a
uniform conditional tariff that is the same for both the low and high quality
firm. This is followed by the analysis of the discriminative conditional tariff.
4.1 Uniform conditional tariff
The government first announces its MQL. The MQL informs the firms on the
minimum quality that exempts their exports from the tariff. Following the
announcement of the MQL firms decide on their quality investment. The quality
chosen by the firms determines whether they will be subject to the import tariff,
or not. After the firms decide on their qualities, the government (observing the
qualities) announces the tariff. Finally, the firms compete in quantities.
It is easy to see that if the MQL is at, or less than, the low quality chosen
under free trade it has no impact upon the qualities chosen by the firms. Further,
if the MQL equals the quality chosen by the low quality firm under free trade
tariff revenues are zero. Thus the government is only able to change the qualities
and generate tariff revenues if the MQL exceeds the (low) quality chosen under
free trade, s
FT
2
= 0.090223
¯
θ. If the MQL is slightly above s
FT
2
the low quality
firm has two options. The first is to invest below s
FT
2
paying the import tariff
and the other is to invest above it. If the firm decides to pay the import tariff
once more it chooses s
FT
2
. In the case that the firm invests above s
FT
2
then it
18
Such a separation of government policy has been studied before by several authors in a
different context. Cooper y Riezman (1989) study a model in which the government first
studies what trade policy instrument to use (subsidies or quotas on exports) and in a later
stage decide on the levels. Arvan (1991) and Shivakumar (1993) extend this model and
study the effect of choosing its policy before (assuming commitment), or after (assuming no
commitment), the firms get to know their true demands.
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will always choose the MQL set by the government. Given that total welfare is
increasing in quality the government is interested in setting a MQL above s
FT
2
.
Figure 6: Total welfare and profits under conditional tariff: Low Quality Firm
In figure (6) we see the maximium profits of the low quality firm given the
best response of the high quality firm (see [3a] paying no tariff) for quality
s
FT
2
. Beyond s
FT
2
profits in equilibrium will be smaller if the firm invests more
in quality. Contrarily, total welfare (SW
FT
) increases in low quality (given
that no firm pays the tariff and the rival best responding). The low quality
firm always sets its quality equal to the MQL (given that it earns greater than
setting a lower quality and paying the import tariff). That is,
s
2
= s if Π
2
(fr
1
(s; t
1
= t
2
= 0), s)  Π
L
2
s
2
= s
L
2
otherwise
It is interesting to see how the choice of the uniform conditional tariff in-
fluences quality choice by the two firms. Looking at the figure we see that any
MQL s
FT
2
does not affect quality investment for either firm. Further, as nei-
ther firms pay the tariff the government does not change the equilibrium from
free trade. Thus the government only gains if it sets a MQL above s
FT
2
. For a
MQL above s
FT
2
we see that the low quality firm still makes greater profits than
paying the tariff and staying at point L (on Π
LT
2
). The low quality firm always
chooses the MQL till the point MCL where its profits exactly equal the profits
at point L. If the MQL were to be greater than MCL it always chooses point L.
The government thus knows that it can only increase low quality in the range
(s
FT
2
, s
∗
].
In figure 6 we can observe that the profits for the low quality firm that meets
the MQL and pays the import tariff are represented by the point MCL. This
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point corresponds to a quality level , s
2
= s
∗
= 0.133885θ
2
, for the low quality
firm. In the case that the government sets s
∗
as the MQL the equilibrium values
are the following:
s
s
1
= 0.254011θ
2
s
s
2
= 0.133885θ
2
q
s
1
= 0.424115θ q
s
2
= 0.287942θ
p
s
1
= 0.10773θ
3
p
s
2
= 0.038551θ
3
Π
s
1
= 0.013429θ
4
Π
s
2
= 0.002138θ
4
Table 4: Equilibrium values: Uniform conditional tariff.
Given that both the firms invest above the required minimum, neither pays
the import tariff. The government thus earns zero tariff revenues. Total con-
sumer (total) surplus in this case is CS
s
= SW
s
= 0.044745θ
4
. Total welfare
obtained under a uniform tariff is greater than under free trade, SW
FT
=
0.040174θ
4
.
Lemma 3 Total welfare under a uniform conditional tariff, SW
s
= 0.044745θ
4
,
is greater than under free trade, SW
FT
= 0.040174θ
4
. Neither firm pays the
import tariff producing quality at, or above, the MQL.
Quality investment by both the firms is greater than under free trade. As
a result profits for both the firms decline. The government is able to increase
quality investment and achieves a higher level of welfare. Even though prices
increase and total output declines the increase in quality more than compensates
for the increase in the price and the fall in output. Consumer surplus for both,
the low and high, quality consumers is greater than under free trade.
If the government sets the MQL above s
∗
the low quality firm prefers to
produce the quality s
LT
2
, paying the import tariff and making greater profits.
On the other hand the government has no incentive to set the MQL above s
∗
as
it decreases total welfare.
It now interesting to look at the incentives of the high quality firm given
that the MQL>s
∗
. Profits for the high quality firm are denoted by pi
LT
1
when
the low quality firm pays the tariff. Profits for the high quality firm are much
higher (pi
B
1
) if both firms pay the tariff. In any range between B and MCH the
high quality firm will always choose a quality slightly below the MQL. Further,
knowing that a high tariff works to the detriment of the low quality firm the
high quality firm always invests below the MQL in the range (B,MCH] making
greater profits. The government, however, never wants both the firms to pay
the tariff as its welfare is lower in this case (SW
B
< SW
LT
). Knowing that
it cannot increase quality investment of the high quality firm above s
B
1
, the
government, always prefers a MQL in the range (s
FT
2
, s
∗
].
The results under a uniform conditional tariff are summarized in the follow-
ing proposition:
Proposition 4 The government maximizes total welfare choosing a MQL of
s
∗
= 0.133885θ
2
. In equilibrium no firm pays the import tariff. The low quality
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Figure 7: Total welfare and profits for the high quality firm: Uniform conditional
tariff.
firm sets its quality (s
∗
2
) exactly equal to the MQL and the high quality firm
produces quality s
s
1
= 0.254011θ
2
.
4.2 Discriminatory conditional tariff
In this section we look at the possibility that the government sets a different
conditional import tariff for both the exporting firms. The advantage of the
discriminative conditional tariff is that it allows the government to influence the
quality investment of the high quality firm. Knowing that welfare is increasing
in high quality, the government chooses a high enough MQL that results in
the high quality firm meeting the MQL and not paying the tax. In the case
of the discriminatory tariff the high quality firm does not have the incentive
to lower its quality investment and pay the import tariff. The incentives for
the high quality firm are just the opposite in this case. Under a discriminatory
conditional tariff the government chooses a high MQL. In equilibrium the high
quality firm invests exactly equal to the MQL and earns less than it would if
it were to pay an import tariff. The low quality firm, meanwhile, selects a
substantially lower quality (relative to the uniform conditional tariff), selling
less and makes less profits. A discriminatory conditional tariff works to the
detriment of both the firms.
This is seen in the figure (8) below where, pi
LT
1
indicates profits for the high
quality firm when only the low quality firm pays the tariff. pi
˜
B
1
, on the other
hand, indicates profits made by the high quality firm when both the firms pay
the conditional import tariff. It is thus clear that if the government were to
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choose the MQL below s
L
1
then it will be non-binding on the high quality firm
as it will always choose s
L
1
maximizing profits at L. The area to the right of L
is thus the region in which the government can increase total welfare (with the
high quality firm increasing its quality investment). Noticing that total welfare
is increasing in s
1
the government wants the high quality firm to moves down
its profit curve (pi
LT
1
). The highest MQL the government will choose is
˜
MCH
that leaves the high quality firm indifferent between paying the tariff making
pi
˜
B
1
(point
˜
B), or not paying the tariff and staying at point
˜
MCH(= s˜
∗
). Under
a discriminative tariff the government thus chooses a MQL that coincides with
s˜
∗
(= 0.450403θ
2
) maximizing total welfare.
Figure 8: Profits high-quality and total welfare under a discriminative condi-
tional tariff.
Note, however, if both the firms pay the tariff then the welfare obtained
by the government is much lower (SW
˜
B
= 0.02355θ
4
at s˜
˜
B
1
) than if only the
low quality firm pays the tariff. Any MQL slightly below
˜
MCH gives the
government welfare greater than the case where the high quality firm chooses
quality s˜
˜
B
1
.
Proposition 5 The importing country, setting discriminatory tariffs, increases
welfare over free trade (and uniform the conditional tariff) setting a MQL s
L
1
.
The welfare maximizing MQL is s˜
∗
= 0.450403θ
2
and each firm pays tariff:
t
1
=
s
1
(3s
1
−s
2
)θ
9s
1
−s
2
y t
2
=
2s
1
s
2
θ
9s
1
−s
2
. Welfare under the discriminatory conditional
tariff equals SW = 0.062528θ
4
.
The equilibrium values obtained under the discriminatory tariff are summa-
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rized in the table below.
s
s˜
1
= 0.450403θ
2
s
s˜
2
= 0.06562θ
2
q
s˜
1
= 0.481565θ q
s˜
2
= 0.253073θ
p
s˜
1
= 0.216898θ
3
p
s˜
2
= 0.017413θ
3
Π
s˜
1
= 0.003019θ
4
Π
s˜
2
= 0.00205θ
4
Table 5: Equilibrium values under the discriminative conditional tariff.
As can be seen, only the low quality firm pays the import tariff t
2
=
0.000806θ
3
. Tariff revenues obtained by the government are R = 0.000204θ
4
and consumer surplus for the high and low quality consumers, respectively, is
CS
1
= 0.060222θ
4
y CS
2
= 0.002101θ
4
.
The discriminative conditional tariff has important effects on the strategic
choice of quality by both the low, and high, quality firm. Both firms earn less
profits. The low quality firm decreases quality investment and the high quality
firm increases quality investment. Consumer surplus and total welfare under
a discriminatory conditional tariff is greater than under any other tariff policy.
Under a discriminatory tariff the government is able to affect quality investment
by the high quality firm. This ability to affect quality investment of the high
quality firm, is not present under the uniform tariff.
5 Conclusion
We have seen that in a vertically differentiated industry a per-unit import tariff,
uniform or discriminatory, always lowers total welfare for an importing country.
This occurs due to the strategic behaviour of the exporting firm that lowers
its quality investment anticipating the tariff. A government loses the strategic
advantage of an import tariff due to its inability to control quality investment by
the firm. Due to decreased quality investment consumer surplus is lower. This
decline is greater than the tariff revenues and hence total welfare declines. This
result is important as it indicates that in models where the government targets
more than one instrument (not just price, or output) a simple tariff policy may
be welfare decreasing. This results suggest that multiple instruments may be
much more effective in such environments.
Given that a simple import tariff has a distortionary affect on quality in-
vestment by firms we propose a conditional import tariff as an alternative trade
policy instrument. The conditional import tariff depends on a certain Minimum
Quality Limit (MQL) whereby, any firm failing to meet it pays an import tariff.
In this sense, the MQL is a generalized version of the Minimum Quality Stan-
dard as it allows sale of a good below a certain minimum threshold (under a
MQS this tariff is prohibitive). A firm unable to meet the threshold simply pays
the tariff. We show that if the governmet has at its disposal two instruments
(a MQL and a conditional import tariff) and two targets (output and quality)
then the conditional import tariff can be a welfare improving policy tool in the
hands of an importing government.
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We study the effect of a conditional import tariff on the welfare of an im-
porting country when firms compete in quantities. We define a conditional tariff
as a tariff that depends on a certain minimum quality level being met. If a firm
does not meet this minimum it pays an import tariff, otherwise it is exempt.
In this manner the government has an instrument for quality (a MQL) and an
instrument for output. With such a two-part instrument a government is able
to improve domestic welfare. We analyze two different conditional tariffs. First,
we study a uniform conditional tariff that is the same for both, high and low
quality, firms. Subsequently we study a discriminative tariff. We show that
highest welfare is obtained by an importing country under a discriminative con-
ditional tariff. Welfare under a discriminative tariff is higher than under free
trade, or a uniform conditional tariff.
The effect on quality chosen by the firms is different under a uniform and a
discriminative conditional tariff. A uniform conditional tariff has a detrimental
effect on the low quality firm. The high quality firm in this case can lower
quality investment thus increasing the competitve presurre on the low quality
firm. This clearly works to the detriment of the low quality firm that makes
lower profits. The government, however, is unable to affect quality investment
by the high quality firm under the uniform conditional tariff. The MQL chosen
in equilibrium is such that neither the low, or the high, quality firm pay the
conditonal import tariff. The low quality firm chooses a substantially higher
level of quality than under free trade. Even though in equilibrium neither firm
pays the conditional import tariff total welfare increases due to the increase in
consumer surplus (average quality increases).
The MQL set by the government lies in the intermediate range of the qualities
chosen by the firms under free trade. The reason is that the high quality firm
will never produce a quality greater than it does under free trade. In fact, for
a high enough MQL, it is in the interest of the high quality firm to choose a
quality level slightly below the MQL provoking a higher tax
19
on the low quality
firm
20
. The high import tariff decreases the competitiveness of the low quality
firm. This works to the advantage of the high quality firm and it earns greater
profits than it would earn otherwise. However, it is not to the advantage of the
government to set a high MQL. A high MQL lowers quality investment by both
the firms resulting in lower total welfare. The government, as a result, selects
an MQL that is somewhere between the qualities chosen by the two firms under
free trade.
The story under the discriminative conditional tariff is different. The gov-
ernment is able to affect quality investment by both the firms under the dis-
criminative tariff. Each firm pays a separate tariff, the MQL is high enough
such that the quality chosen by the high quality firm is substantially higher
than under free trade. The low quality firm, however, invests less in quality.
Total domestic welfare of the importing country is greater than under both free
19
The import tariff paid by both the firms is greater than when only the low quality firm
pays it.
20
The strategy of reducing its quality investment and paying the tariff is optimal for the
high quality firm for a MQL greater than 0.137533θ
2
.
19
trade and the uniform conditional tariff. The low quality firm pays an import
tariff while the high quality firm produces at the MQL (not paying the import
tariff). Output sold in the market is higher. Firm profits are, however, much
lower than under free trade.
In this paper we have attemped to study the role of quality instruments
in a tariff game. We have shown with a single instrument the government is
unable to counteract the negative effect of decreased quality investment upon
welfare. A simple import tariff in this case is welfare decreasing. Allowing for a
quality and output instrument we show that the government can counteract the
strategic behaviour of the firms. The importing government achieves increased
quality investment that is welfare improving. The role of quality instruments is
shown to have important effect on the welfare of the importing country.
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.1 Import tariff:Low quality
In the second stage of the game the government selects an import tariff on the
low quality import. Setting t
1
= 0, the government maximizing welfare selects
a tariff on the low quality import, t
2
, given outputs [4a] and [4b]:
max
t
2
SW
s.a t
1
= 0
The solution to this maximization problem gives us the import tariff on the
low quality good:
t
2
=
s
2
2
θ
12s
1
− s
2
(11)
Notice that the import tariff is decreasing in high quality (s
1
) and increasing
in low quality (s
2
). It is clear from this that the low quality firm has incentives to
lower its investment in quality. Knowing that the low quality firm has incentives
to decrease it quality investment, and that investment in quality is costly, the
high quality firm also lowers its quality investment. The incentives to alter
investment for both the high and low quality firms are clear from the first order
condition above.
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Given the import tariff [11] firms select qualities in the first stage. The first
order condition give us the following quality reaction functions:
s
1
=
4
(
108s
3
1
− 27s
2
1
s
2
− s
3
2
)
θ
2
(12s
1
− s
2
)
3
(12a)
s
2
=
9s
2
1
(12s
1
+ s
2
) θ
2
(12s
1
− s
2
)
3
(12b)
A look at the reaction fucntions (figure 9) helps us in understanding firm incen-
tives.
The import tariff shifts the reaction curve of the low quality firm inwards.
Regardless of the quality offered by the high quality firm the low quality firm
invests less in quality (relative to the free trade level of quality investment). The
high quality firm responds optimally and also lowers its quality investment. In-
creasing its quality investment (i.e. increasing product differentiation) is not the
optimal response for the high quality firm given that the low quality firm always
lowers its quality investment. As a result both firms lower quality invesment in
response to an import tariff on the low quality firm.
Figure 9: Import tariff on Low Quality Imports
Equilibrium qualities are obtained from equations [12a] and [12b]. Equilib-
rium output, prices and qualities are presented in the table below:
Given the equilibrium values the import tariff on the low quality good and
tariff revenues aret
L
2
= 0.001605θ
3
and R
L
= 0.000411θ
4
, respectively. Con-
sumer surplus and total welfare are CS
L
= 0.037356θ
4
and SW
L
= 0.037766θ
4
,
respectively.
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sL
1
= 0.249531θ
2
s
L
2
= 0.068529θ
2
q
L
1
= 0.464867θ q
L
2
= 0.255855θ
p
L
1
= 0.115999θ
3
p
L
2
= 0.019138θ
3
Π
L
1
= 0.022791θ
4
Π
L
2
= 0.002138θ
4
Table 6: Equilibrium quality, output and prices.
Proposition 6 A tariff on low quality imports lowers total welfare for the im-
porting country, SW
L
= 0.037766θ
4
, relative to free trade SW
FT
= 0.040174θ
4
.
Investment in quality by both the low and high quality firm decrease relative
to free trade. The high quality firm increases its profits while the low quality
firm decreases its profits relative to free trade. Consumer surplus decreases
relative to free trade and the decline is greater than the tariff revenues.
.2 Import tariff:High quality
Given outputs [4a] and [4b] the government sets the tariff on the high quality
firm maximizing:
max
t
1
CS +R
s.a t
2
= 0
From the first order condistions we obtain the tariff:
t
1
=
s
1
(4s
1
− 3s
2
) θ
12s
1
− s
2
(13)
In the last stage firms choose qualities maximizing profits. The first prder
conditions give us the quality reaction functions:
s
1
=
(
192s
3
1
− 48s
2
1
s
2
+ 4s
1
s
2
2
− s
3
2
)
θ
2
(12s
1
− s
2
)
3
(14a)
s
2
=
16s
2
1
(12s
1
+ s
2
) θ
2
(12s
1
− s
2
)
3
(14b)
The implicit reaction functions [14a] and [14b] can be seen in the figure 10.
As observed before, the import tariff shifts the reaction function of the high
quality firm inwards. The high quality firm invests less in quality due to an
import tariff. However, unlike what was observed in the case of the low quality
tariff, the effect on the rival firm is just the opposite. The low quality firm in
this case invests more in quality because competition softens in the quantity
stage due to the tariff. An import tariff on the high quality firm thus decreases
quality investment by the high, and increases quality investment by the low,
quality firm.
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Figure 10: Tariff on the high quality firm.
The ex-post tariff on the high quality firm is very high. Due to the high
import tariff equilibria in pure strategies no longer exists. The high quality firm
makes negative profits in the presence of the import tariff. This occurs as a
high quality exporting firm, facing the high ex-post tariff, has no incentives to
sell the high quality good. In this case nor does the low quality firm have an
incentives to leapfrog and produce the high quality good as it would then face
the same high ex-post tariff. The results are stated in the following proposition:
Proposition 7 If an importing country set tariffs only on the high quality good
then an equilibria in pure strategies does not exists.
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